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1 Introduction
In this paper we propose a series of ten experimental decision tasks involving two-outcome
lottery choices. Five of these tasks are aimed at eliciting a subjects attitude towards risk
and the other ve are designed to study her attitude towards ambiguity. We derive specic
theoretical predictions about a subjects behavior in the latter decision tasks, by relying on
the Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) smooth ambiguity model (henceforth KMM ).
The paper has three main goals.
The rst objective is to propose a simple experimental method able to makeKMM oper-
ational in individual decision tasks. This is why the experimental environment is explicitly
designed in order to match KMM intuition of modelling ambiguity through two-stage lot-
teries. In such an environment, we are able to provide two di¤erent operational denitions
of ambiguity aversion. The rst one, namely value-ambiguity attitude, is based on Becker
and Brownson (1964) idea that individuals are willing to pay money to avoid actions
involving ambiguity(p. 5).1 A value-ambiguity-averse subject values an ambiguous lot-
tery less than its unambiguous equivalent with the same mean probabilities. In the KMM
model, this is true if the subjects  function is concave. The second denition, namely
choice-ambiguity attitude, relies on Gollier (2012) intuition that more ambiguity-averse
subjects should have a smaller demand for a risky asset whose distribution of return is am-
biguous. Notice that a portfolio containing a larger share invested in the risky asset may be
seen as a two-stage lottery where second-order objective probabilities are more dispersed.
In the KMM framework, Gollier (2012) has shown that an ambiguity-averse subject could
have a larger demand for the risky asset than another ambiguity-neutral subject with the
same risk aversion, thereby stating that a choice-ambiguity-averse subject is not necessarily
value-ambiguity-averse. On the other hand, Gollier (2012) provides su¢ cient conditions on
the structure of the two-stage uncertainty to re-establish the link between the concavity of
 and ambiguity aversion. Given that one of these conditions is satised in our experimen-
tal decision tasks, we expect to nd an equivalence between value-ambiguity attitude and
choice-ambiguity attitude, that we dene as coherent-ambiguity attitude within the KMM
framework.
The second objective of the paper is to test the reliability of KMM in the ve decision
tasks aimed at studying a subjects attitude towards ambiguity. In all ambiguous deci-
sion tasks the subject faces always the same two (second-stage) lottery-outcomes. Thus,
1After Becker and Brownson (1964), the idea that information which reduces ambiguity has a positive
value for ambiguity-averse subjects has been clearly stated within di¤erent decision-theoretic models: e.g.,
Quiggin (2007), using Machina (2004) concept of almost-objective acts; Attanasi and Montesano (2012),
relying on the Choquet expected utility model. Moreover, focusing on a specic adaptation of KMM, Snow
(2010) has proved that the value of information that resolves ambiguity increases with greater ambiguity
and with greater ambiguity aversion. Attanasi and Montesano (2012) have found similar results within
the Choquet model.
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within the same treatment, each ambiguous task di¤ers from the next one only because
of the level of ambiguity of the decision setting and/or because of a rst-degree stochastic
improvement in the distribution of second-order probabilities. In particular, these tasks
are designed such that, once a subject has been classied as coherent-ambiguity-averse,
coherent-ambiguity-neutral or coherent-ambiguity-loving, the sign of the variation of her
certainty equivalent from one task to the next one should depend only on this classica-
tion. Therefore, this sign should be predicted directly by the signof her attitude towards
ambiguity as determined within KMM. This means that, by construction, the verication
of our main theoretical predictions in these tasks should be independent of the subjects
degree of risk aversion as elicited in the ve unambiguous tasks. Finding an e¤ect of risk
attitude over the behavioral verication of our theoretical hints would raise some doubts
on the use of KMM as reference model for the tasks proposed in our experiment. The
elicitation of risk attitude is also important in order to empirically state whether it inu-
ences the signof the ambiguity attitude, i.e. which one of the three ambiguity attitudes
(aversion, neutrality, or proneness) the subject could show. Our design is also aimed at
stating whether this signmay depend on the riskiness of the second-stage lottery, i.e. on
the spread of the di¤erence of its two lottery-outcomes. In order to be consistent in the
elicitation of risk attitude and of ambiguity attitude, we use the same pair of instruments
for both attitudes. In particular, we elicit risk attitude both through a portfolio choice
method and through a BeckerDeGrootMarschak (1964) mechanism (henceforth, BDM).
Correspondingly, we state choice-ambiguity aversion through the rst method and value-
ambiguity aversion through the second one. The combination of the two instruments has
a twofold role. For risk attitude, it allows to check that both instruments lead to similar
subjectsorderings. For ambiguity attitude, it enables to elicit separately the two features
of (coherent)-ambiguity attitude introduced above within KMM. Concerning risk attitude,
once veried the correlation between the two risk-aversion orderings, we rely on the results
of the portfolio choice method: this has the advantage of imposing some theoretically de-
rived constraints which allow to check whether the subjects selected portfolio is compatible
with a constant absolute and/or a constant relative risk aversion specication. Concerning
ambiguity attitude, throughout the article we consider as classied subjectsonly those
who provide coherent answers under the two instruments. This provides a rationale for the
term coherentto identify the kind of ambiguity attitude studied in this paper.
The third objective of the paper is to analyze how subjectsdecisions under ambiguity
react to di¤erent distributions of second-order probabilities. The experiment consists of
three treatments, according to a between-subject design. The ve unambiguous tasks
do not vary among treatments, while the ambiguous tasks are di¤erent for each treatment
according to the way in which uncertainty over the composition of the urns used to perform
them is generated. More precisely, the rst of these tasks relies on a 10-ball small urn with
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inside white and orange balls whose composition is not told to subjects. In all treatments
this composition is generated through a random draw from a big urn, introduced in order
to mimic KMM two-stage lottery approach. In treatment 1, the composition of the 10-ball
small urn is determined through a Bernoullian process over a 50-white-50-orange balls big
urn, thereby leading to a binomial distribution of second-order probabilities. In treatment
2, subjects are shown that second-order probabilities over the composition of the 10-ball
small urn are uniformly distributed. In treatment 3, subjects have no information about
the composition of the 10-ball small urn, although to make it comparable to treatment
1 ambiguity is generated through a two-stage lottery procedure similar to the one of the
binomial treatment, but without giving any information about the composition of the big
urn. The uniform distribution of the second-order probabilities in treatment 2 is clearly a
mean-preserving spread of the binomial distribution obtained in treatment 1. Treatment 3
is intrinsically more ambiguous than treatment 1. Therefore, under ambiguity aversion, we
expect that in the rst ambiguous task of both the uniform and the unknown treatment the
subject assigns a lower value to the ambiguous lottery than in the corresponding task of the
binomial treatment. This should happen also in the remaining ambiguous tasks, given that,
once the 10-ball small urn is generated, the way its composition is modiedin order to
vary the level of ambiguity and the distribution of second-order probabilities is the same in
each treatment. Although our design is not within-subject, we can check the above stated
predictions by comparing the distribution of subjectsdecisions in the ambiguous tasks of
the three treatments. This treatment comparison would hold only under the assumption
that the distribution of subjectsdegree of risk aversion does not di¤er among the three
treatments. This is an additional motivation for eliciting risk attitude before looking at
subjectsdecisions in the ambiguous tasks.
Since Ellsberg (1961), several papers have empirically investigated the descriptive and
predictive power of theories of decision making under ambiguity.2 Some of them have in-
vestigated ambiguity attitude by explicitly excluding two-stage probability models.3 Some
others have produced experimental designs aimed at comparing the performance of KMM
to that of non-expected utility models. Within this second group of studies, Halevy (2007)
is surely the closest to our paper in terms of experimental design: we use a similar BDM
mechanism to elicit risk attitude and value-ambiguity attitude. However, there are two
main di¤erences. On the one hand, compared to Halevy (2007) our experimental design
allows to study the variation of the subjects certainty equivalent for a larger number of
ambiguity levels and of distribution of second-order probabilities. This enables to formu-
late a richer set of theoretical relations that a subjects decisions have to satisfy in order
2Early literature is surveyed in Camerer and Weber (1992) and Camerer (1995).
3See for example Hey, Lotito and Ma¢ oletti (2010), and Hey and Pace (2011): both experimental
designs are aimed at testing only non-two stage probability models.
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for KMM to pass the test. On the other hand, we propose the three treatments bino-
mial, uniformand unknownbetween subjects: Halevy (2007) proposes only the last
two treatments, and, more importantly, within subjects. This enables him to examine the
relation between attitude towards ambiguity and attitude towards reduction of compound
(objective) lotteries, an issue that is outside the goals of our paper. Halevy (2007) nds
that there is no unique theoretical decision model that captures all subjects behavior.
However, 15%-20% of his subjects are ambiguity neutral and able to reduce compound
lotteries.4 Another 35% of subjects exhibit ambiguity aversion (proneness) together with
aversion (proneness) to mean preserving spreads in the second-order distribution. Both
these categories of subjects are consistent with KMM.
Also Conte and Hey (2012) compare the performance of di¤erent theoretical decision
models  expected utility, KMM, rank dependent expected utility, and Alpha model of
Ghirardato, Maccheroni and Marinacci (2004) with an experimental design quite dif-
ferent from Halevy (2007) and so from ours. They nd results in favor of KMM both
through individual estimates (56% of subjects have behavior consistent with KMM ) and
by classifying subjects through posterior probabilities of each of them being coherent with
one over four types of preferences (50% for KMM ). Their results clearly suggest that KMM
performs the best among the four tested models.
Not all experimental studies nd support for KMM. Ahn et al. (2011) nd a result
opposite to the one of Conte and Hey (2012) by performing a portfolio choice experiment
aimed at investigating rank-dependent theories versus smooth ambiguity à la KMM. Their
tests of signicance suggest that the majority of subjects are well described by the sub-
jective expected utility model. Moreover, among the remaining subjects, KMM is not
able to explain the behavior of those subjects showing ambiguity aversion. Close to our
paper, Ahn et al. (2011) implement an experimental design where subjects are asked to
choose between di¤erent lotteries that duplicate the return of a portfolio containing a safe
asset and an ambiguous asset. However, di¤erently from their study, in each task of our
experiment the asset contained in the portfolio is either safe or ambiguous. Moreover, we
simplify the choice problem by limiting the choice set to only four possible portfolios, and
by considering an uncertain environment with only two states of nature.
There are not so many experiments explicitly designed to test the KMM model only:
Chakravarty and Roy (2009) is one of them. As in our paper, they try to separate attitude
towards risk from that towards ambiguity, although using an experimental instrument 
the multiple price list method di¤erent from the two used in this paper. Their main
objective is di¤erent from ours: investigating potential di¤erences in subjects behavior
under uncertainty over gains versus uncertainty over losses. For what concerns the domain
4In a similar experimental environment, Abdellaoui, Klibano¤ and Placido (2011) nd evidence that
do not support the equivalence between ambiguity neutrality and reduction of compound lotteries.
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of gains (the only one that can be compared with our design), they nd a positive correlation
between risk attitude and ambiguity attitude (although in the aggregate subjects are risk-
averse and ambiguity-neutral). Their result is not isolated. Among several experimental
studies about a possible relation between risk attitude and ambiguity attitude, only few
papers nd no correlation (Cohen, Ja¤ray and Said, 1987; Cohen, Tallon and Vergnaud,
2011), while many studies nd a positive correlation (e.g., Lauriola and Levin, 2001; Di
Mauro and Ma¢ oletti, 2004; Bossaerts et al., 2010; Ahn et al., 2011).
The idea that attitudes toward risk and ambiguity can be qualitatively di¤erent in a
subject has been stated by Andersen et al. (2009) within an experimental design that
directly refers to KMMs second-order acts. They estimate attitudes toward ambiguity,
attitudes toward risk, and subjective probabilities in a rigorous manner within KMM, by
making some parametric assumptions about the form of the distribution of the priors and
the uncertain process. They nd subjects who are risk-averse, and yet at the same time
ambiguity-loving. To the best of our knowledge, this is the only experimental work that
clearly states that attitudes toward risk and ambiguity can be opposite.
Our experimental ndings are in line with Conte and Hey (2012) about the performance
of KMM : almost 90% of subjects can be classied as averse, neutral or loving according
to our operational denition of coherent-ambiguity-attitude. Moreover, more than 75% of
classied subjects comply with our theoretical predictions in all ambiguous tasks of the
experiment, independent of their degree of risk aversion. This percentage decreases if we
consider only coherent-ambiguity-loving subjects or only the uniform treatment. Coherent-
ambiguity-neutral subjects are those who have the highest percentage of compliance with
KMM predicted behavior. Recalling that for these subjects KMM reduces to the expected
utility model, we can relate this result to the one found by Halevy (2007) about the higher
ability of ambiguity-neutral subjects to reduce compound lotteries.
Further, we nd that highly-risk-averse subjects are more prone to coherent-ambiguity.
This may lead to think to a sort of negative correlation between risk attitude and ambiguity
attitude, as the one found by Andersen et al. (2009). This point requires a more thorough
discussion. Notice that our experimental design only allows to state the sign of the
subjects (coherent)-ambiguity attitude, i.e. whether she is (coherent)-ambiguity-averse,
neutral or loving. Separating all classied subjects in three groups according to this sign,
we nd signicant di¤erences in the distributions of the degree of risk aversion among the
three groups. In particular, (coherent)-ambiguity-averse and (coherent)-ambiguity neutral
subjects have on average a low degree of risk aversion, while the vast majority of (coherent)-
ambiguity-loving subjects is highly-risk-loving. A careful analysis of the experimental data
claries that this result is linked to the riskiness of the second-stage lottery the subject is
assigned in the ambiguous tasks. The higher the degree of risk aversion, the riskier the
chosen lottery in an ambiguous task, the higher the reduction of the value of this lottery
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when the distribution of outcomes becomes ambiguous.
Finally, we nd that the percentage of coherently-ambiguity-averse subjects is lower
in the binomial than in the uniform and in the unknown treatment. However, only the
di¤erence between the binomial and the unknown treatment is statistically signicant. This
result is partially in line with the ndings of Abdellaoui, Klibano¤ and Placido (2011), for
the part where they state that attitude towards ambiguity and attitude towards compound
risks are related but distinct, with this relationship being quite sensitive to the type of
compound risks considered. They dene as compound risk those decision tasks where the
second-order probability distribution over the one-stage lotteries is objective: both our
binomial and our uniform treatment belong to this category. Therefore, also in our case
the relation between what they call ambiguity (our unknown treatment) and what they call
compound risk depends on the type of compound risk considered, e.g. binomial or uniform.
However, there are two crucial di¤erences between our experimental design and that of
Abdellaoui, Klibano¤ and Placido (2011). First of all, although analyzing our uniform
case, they do not analyze our binomial case, focusing instead on the hypergeometric case.
And they actually nd that it is the latter case the one having the strongest relationship
with ambiguity attitude. Second, and more importantly, as Halevy (2007), they have
a within-subject design, while in our experiment each subject only participates in one
treatment, hence facing only one of the three second-order probability distributions that
we generate in order to implement ambiguity: binomial, uniform or unknown.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes our experimental
design, by highlighting the motivations behind the ten decision tasks. Section 3 analyzes
the ve decision tasks under ambiguity and presents the main theoretical results. Section
4 presents the results of our experiment. Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental Design
Experimental subjects were graduate students in Economics of the Toulouse School of Eco-
nomics (TSE). Computerized sessions where conducted at the Laboratory of Experimental
Economics of TSE.
A total of 105 experimental subjects (42 women, 63 men, average age = 23:7) par-
ticipated in our experiment, with each subject participating only once. Average earnings
were approximately e 20.50 per subject, including a e 5.00 show-up fee. The experiment
was programmed using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) and subjects were seated
in isolated cubicles in front of computer terminals. Three treatments were run through
a between subjects design, with the same number of subjects (N = 35) participating in
each treatment. The number of subjects in each session varied from a minimum of 9 to a
7
maximum of 18.5
The experiment consists of ten decision tasks per treatment. At the beginning of the
experiment, participants were told how many tasks there are. However, instructions of the
new task were given and read aloud prior to that task. After instructions were read aloud,
the decision task appeared on the screen and participants had three minutes to answer the
task. The average duration of the experiment was 65 minutes, including construction of
the unknownsmall urns (only for treatment 1 and 3), performance of one over the ten
tasks and participantsnal payment. The nal payment of each participant depended
only on the choice made by this participant in the ten decision tasks and on some random
draws which we explain in detail below. Only one of the ten decision tasks was randomly
selected at the end of the experiment to determine participantsnal earnings.
The ten tasks of our experimental design di¤er in terms of the elicitation method
applied and/or of the scope of that elicitation (see Table 1). Tasks 1-5 do not vary among
treatments, while tasks 6-10 are di¤erent for each treatment according to the way in which
uncertainty over the composition of the urns used to perform these tasks is generated.
All Treatments Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Task Elicitation Method Features of the lotteries
1-4 Portfolio Choice Simple Lottery5 BDM mechanism6-9 Binomial
Compound Lottery
Uniform
Compound Lottery
Unknown
(Compound) Lottery10 Portfolio Choice
Table 1. Main features of the ten decision tasks.
In each task from 1 to 4 the experimental subject is shown the same small urn with 5
white balls and 5 orange balls inside. She is asked to choose among four simple lotteries
of the type ljt = (x
j
t ; 0:5;x
j
t ; 0:5), with x
j
t ; x
j
t 2 R+, xjt > xjt for each j and t, where
j = A;B;C;D indicates the four lotteries in each task and t = 1; 2; 3; 4 indicates the
task (see Table 2). All ljt in the four tasks rely on the same 5-5 balls small urn, with
white balls assigned to the highest of the two outcomes, xjt . Each l
j
t di¤ers from the other
fteen lotteries proposed in the four tasks in terms of both expected value and standard
deviation. In particular, in each of the four portfolio choices, the higher the index of the
lottery, the higher both its expected value and its standard deviation (see Table B in the
Appendix). Let jt 2 fA;B;C;Dg be the index of the lottery chosen by the subject in
5For treatment 1, we run two sessions, respectively with 17 and 18 students. For treatment 2, we run
three sessions, respectively with 16, 10 and 9 students. For treatment 3, we run three sessions, respectively
with 12, 10 and 13 subjects.
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task t 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g. If a task t between 1 and 4 is selected to be paid at the end of the
experiment, the subject plays for the pair of outcomes she has chosen in that task, namely
xjtt and x
jt
t . She is paid x
jt
t if a white ball is randomly drawn from the 5-5 balls small urn
and she is paid xjtt otherwise.
Task t=1 Task t=2 Task t=3 Task t=4
xj1 x
j
1 x
j
2 x
j
2 x
j
3 x
j
3 x
j
4 x
j
4
lottery j = A 12 6 11 6 20 14 19 14
lottery j = B 16 4 14 4 24 12 22 12
lottery j = C 20 2 17 2 28 10 28 8
lottery j = D 24 0 20 0 32 8 34 4
Table 2. Portfolio Choice in Tasks 1-4: pair of lottery-outcomes.
Tasks 1 to 4 are called portfolio choicesbecause the random outcome parallels the
outcome of a portfolio with one risk-free asset and one risky asset. Indeed, we have that
the outcome ljt of choice j in task t can be written as (wt jt)(1 + rf ) +jt(1 + eyt), where
wt can be interpreted as initial wealth in task t, and 
j
t is the euro investment in the risky
asset: rf is the risk-free rate that is always normalized to 0, and eyt is the return of the risky
asset in task t: The return of the risky asset can take two possible values yt and yt with
equal probabilities. In Table 3, we reinterpret the portfolio contexts and portfolio choices
in the four tasks.
wt yt yt 
j=A
t 
j=B
t 
j=C
t 
j=D
t
Task t=1 8 4 -2 1 2 3 4
Task t=2 8 3 -2 1 2 3 4
Task t=3 16 4 -2 1 2 3 4
Task t=4 16 3 -2 1 2 4 6
Table 3. Reinterpretation of the lottery choices into portfolio choices for tasks 1 to 4.
In task 5 we propose to the subject the same pair of lottery-outcomes she has chosen
in task 4, namely xj44 and x
j4
4 . We use again the same 5-5 balls small urn of tasks 1-4,
with white balls again assigned to xj44 , in order to build the lottery l
j4
4 = (x
j4
4 ; 0:5;x
j4
4 ; 0:5).
Therefore, the subjects initial endowmentin task 5 is her preferred lottery in task 4. In
task 5 the subject has the possibility to sell lj44 through a BDM mechanism.
6 She is asked
6Given that the subject has to set the price at which to sell a random initial endowment, we assign
to her a lottery that she has just declared to prefer among four possible lotteries (task 4). Therefore, her
initial endowment in task 5 (and, as will we see, in tasks 6-9) depends on the choice made in task 4,
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to state the minimal price at which she is willing to sell lj44 , by setting a price between x
j4
4
and xj44 . This reservation price should provide an approximation to the subjects certainty
equivalent of lj44 . Our BDM mechanism is very close to the one implemented by Halevy
(2007). In contrast to Halevy (2007) however, we have four di¤erent lotteries lj4 for which
a subject may state her reservation price and the set of possible buying/selling pricesis
discrete.7
In each of the tasks 6-9 we propose to the subject the same pair of lottery-outcomes
that she has chosen in task 4, with white balls again assigned to xj44 , and we give her
the possibility to sell the respective lottery through the same BDM mechanism of task 5.8
However, the 10-ball small urn used to determine the likelihood of xj44 and of x
j4
4 is not the
same as in tasks 1-5.
In particular, the three treatments di¤er according to the way in which the composition
of the 10-ball small urn used to perform task 6 is determined. More specically:9
 Treatment 1: Binomial. The 10-ball small urn used to perform task 6 is gener-
ated from a transparent big urn containing 50 white balls and 50 orange balls. At
the beginning of task 6, 10 balls are randomly drawn (one after the other, with re-
placement) from the big urn. The colors of these 10 balls determine the composition
of the 10-ball small urn. The outcomes of the 10 random draws are not shown to
the subjects. Therefore, at the moment when the subject states her reservation price
in task 6, the composition of the unknown small urn is a binomial random variable
taking 11 possible values.
although the subject does not know this in task 4.
7As we will see below, in our experiment none of the random draws from any urn is computerized. In
the same spirit of concreteness, also our BDM mechanism is implemented through real tools. There are
four di¤erent envelops, labeled respectively with letter A, B, C and D, i.e. one for each lottery available
in task 4. Each of these envelops contains eleven di¤erent numbered tickets. The distance between each
numbers on the tickets in an envelop is the same, so to have the same number of tickets in each envelop,
with the lowest numbered ticket being equal to xj4 and the highest being equal to x
j
4. In particular, the
eleven tickets inside envelop A are 14; 14:5; :::; 18:5; 19; those inside envelop B are 12; 13; :::; 21; 22; those
inside envelop C are 8; 10; :::; 26; 28; those inside envelop D are 4; 7; :::; 31; 34. The eleven tickets in envelop
j represent the set of possible prices of lottery lj44 , with j = A;B;C;D. A ticket is randomly drawn from
each envelop. The ticket drawn from envelop j determines the random buying pricefor lottery j. Then,
without knowing this price, the subject states her minimal selling price (reservation price) for her lottery
lj44 , by choosing one among the eleven possible prices for lottery j. In case task 5 is selected for payment
at the end of the experiment, the following happens: if, for the lottery the subject owned in task 5, the
subjects minimal selling price is lower than the respective random buying price, the subject sells her
lottery and is paid the latter price. Otherwise, she has to play her lottery, and her payo¤ (xj44 or x
j4
4 )
depends on the ball randomly drawn from the small urn.
8In particular, the subject is told that in each task from 6 to 9 the buying pricesfor the four lotteries
are respectively the same four numbered tickets randomly drawn at the beginning of task 5. Therefore,
although unknown to the subject, the reference buying price for the assigned lottery is the same as in
tasks 5-9. Furthermore, also the set of possible selling prices for each lottery is maintained constant among
tasks 5-9.
9See Figure A in the Appendix.
10
 Treatment 2: Uniform. At the beginning of task 6, we show to the subject a
transparent construction urn10 which contains 11 transparent small urns of 10 balls
each. Each of the 11 small urns has a di¤erent composition in terms of white and
orange balls. One of the 11 small urns is randomly drawn from the construction
urn. Therefore, at the moment when the subject states her reservation price, the
composition of the unknown small urn is a (discrete) uniform random variable taking
11 possible states.
 Treatment 3: Unknown. The 10-ball small urn used to perform task 6 is gener-
ated from an opaque big urn containing 100 white and orange balls with unknown
composition. As in treatment 1, at the beginning of task 6, we draw from the big urn
(one after the other, with replacement) 10 balls whose color determines the compo-
sition of the 10-ball small urn. The outcomes of the 10 random draws are not shown
to the subject. Therefore, the subject states her reservation price in task 6 without
having any information about the composition of the unknown small urn. The reason
why ambiguity is generated through a two-stage lottery is to make this treatment
comparable to treatment 1.11
Tasks 7-9 involve the elimination of some possible compositions of the 10-ball unknown
small urn used to perform task 6. At the beginning of task 7, the subject is told that if
this task would be performed at the end of the experiment, the number of white balls in
the unknown small urn will be between 3 and 7 (and so the number of orange balls). This
would be implemented in the following way. In treatment 1 and treatment 3, 6 balls will be
taken out from the unknown small urn constructed at the beginning of task 6 and replaced
with 3 white balls and 3 orange balls. In treatment 2, 6 transparent small urns (the three
with less than 3 white balls and the three with less than 3 orange balls) will be taken out
from transparent construction urn. Task 8 (9) di¤ers from task 7 only for the fact that in
the unknown small urn the number of white (orange) balls will be between 3 and 10.
In each of the tasks 6-9 the subject, besides stating her reservation price for the lottery
resulting from the corresponding unknown small urn, is also asked to guess the number of
white balls in that urn. In case a task from 6 to 9 is randomly selected to be performed at
the end of the experiment, the subject is paid additional e 5.00 if her guess of the number
of white balls in the unknown small urn of that task was right.
10The term construction urn is borrowed from Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji (2012). Epstein
(2010) calls this the second-order urn.
11In treatment 3, at the beginning of the experiment, after the unknown small urn has been constructed,
a random draw is made from a 2-ball urn containing 1 white ball and 1 orange ball. The color of the
randomly drawn ball is assigned to the highest of the two outcomes in each lottery in all the ten tasks of
the experiment. This additional random draw has been inserted in the design of treatment 3 in order to
make the subject aware that no manipulation from the experimenter is possible about the composition of
the unknown small urn used for tasks 6-10.
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Finally, task 10 is the same as task 4 in terms of elicitation method (portfolio choice)
and in the set of possible pair of outcomes among which the subject has to pick one pair.
However, the 10-ball small urn used to determine the likelihood of the chosen pair, namely
xj1010 and x
j10
10 , is the same as in task 6.
Notice that the subject in each task has no feedback about any random draw performed
in any of the previous tasks. This is because only one of the tasks is selected and actually
performed and only at the end of the experiment.12 Therefore, in our experimental design
the subject cannot make any updating neither about the actual composition of the unknown
small urns nor about the random buying prices in the BDM mechanism. Notice also
that in each session all the urns are real urns (not computerized) and all the random draws
in the experiment (construction of the small urns, random buying prices in the BDM
mechanism, selection of the task determining the subjects nal earnings, performance of
this task) are executed by one of the subjects (indicated in the experimental instructions
as the drawer). This subject is randomly chosen before the beginning of the experiment
among the subjects showing up for the experimental session. She does not participate in
the experiment and is paid a x amount of money ($ 20.00) independent of her random
draws. The reason why we opted for a random human drawerinstead of computerized
random draws is to make participants in the experiment aware that no manipulation from
the experimenter is possible in any of the random draws characterizing the experimental
setting.
3 Theoretical Predictions
We rely on Klibano¤, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) smooth ambiguity model (henceforth
KMM ). Therefore, we assume that the subjects preferences are represented by the von
Neumann - Morgenstern Expected Utility (henceforth EU ) function for simple lotteries
and we relax reduction between rst and second-order probabilities in two-stage lotteries
in order to account for multiplicity/uncertainty of the possible compositions of the second-
stage lottery.
Let us rst present our predictions about subjects behavior in the rst half of the
experimental design, i.e., in the ve tasks aimed at estimating her degree of risk aversion.13
12For tasks 1-4 and 10, performing the task means playing the chosen lottery (random draw of one ball
from the 10-ball small urn). For tasks 5-9, it means playing the assigned lottery only if the subjects selling
price is not lower than the random buying pricefor that lottery.
13Our ten decision tasks are shown to the subject always in the same order. The reason why we propose
tasks 1-5 (which rely on the 5-5 balls small urn) always before tasks 6-10 is because we want to elicit
subjects risk-aversion before introducing unknown/multiple small urns. Further, Halevy (2007) has shown
that the (usually) higher reservation price for the 5-5 balls small urn (our task 5) is not a consequence
of this urn being proposed before the unknown/multiple ones (our tasks 6-9). Finally, our theoretical
results for the subjects reservation price in tasks t = 6; :::; 9 do not suggest that this price should be
12
These ve tasks involve only simple lotteries.
Tasks 1-4 rest on the well-know result in expected utility theory (e.g., Pratt 1964) that
the value of a simple lottery decreases if subjects risk aversion increases. The value of
a simple lottery l with possible returns X is measured by its certainty equivalent CE(l),
which is dened by the following condition:
u(CE(l)) = EU(X);
where we assume that the utility function u is increasing and that it is concave for risk-
averse subjects and convex for risk-loving ones. From the previous relation, we have that
CE(l) decreases if we increase the concavity of u in the sense of Arrow-Pratt. This implies
that, for any task 1-4, an increase in risk aversion will never induce subjects to select a less
risky lottery (in our case, a lottery with less exposure to the risky asset). Given the fact that
lotteries A;B;C;D correspond to di¤erent portfolios with an increasing exposure to the
risky asset, we also know from Arrow (1964) that preferences are unimodal in (A;B;C;D).
Thus, if for example C is preferred to B, it is also the case that it is preferred to A: If one
limits the analysis to a set of utility functions that can be ordered by a single risk aversion
parameter, this allows us to compute for each task three critical degrees of risk aversion,
one for indi¤erence between the least risky lottery A and the riskier lottery B, one for
indi¤erence between lotteries B and C, and one for indi¤erence between lotteries C and
D.
Suppose rst that the subject hasConstantAbsoluteRiskAversion (henceforthCARA),
so that u(c) = 1   exp( ARA c) for all c. Under this specication, one can compute for
task 1 the critical ARAAB1 that yields indi¤erence between lotteries A and B:
1
2
exp( ARAAB1 xA1 ) +
1
2
exp( ARAAB1 xA1 ) =
1
2
exp( ARAAB1 xB1 ) +
1
2
exp( ARAAB1 xB1 )
We obtain ARAAB1 = 0:077. We can proceed in a similar fashion for the other pairs of
lotteries (B;C) and (C;D), and for the other tasks 2, 3 and 4. Under CARA, it is well
known (e.g., Gollier 2001) that the optimal portfolio composition is independent of initial
wealth. From Table 3, we know that tasks 1 and 3 correspond to the same portfolio
problem, but with di¤erent initial wealth levels respectively equal to w1 = 8 and w3 = 16:
This implies that ARAj;j+11 = ARA
j;j+1
3 for all pairs of lotteries (j; j + 1). In other words,
a CARA subject should answer in exactly the same way for these two tasks. A similar
observation can be made for tasks 2 and 4. The interpretation of Table 4 is the following:
if the subjects ARA is inside the interval (0:054; 0:077], then she should pick the pattern
always increasing or always decreasing with t. Rather, it should depend on the subjects attitude towards
ambiguity (e.g., see (5) and (7) below).
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(lj11 ; l
j2
2 ; l
j3
3 ; l
j4
4 ) = (B;A;B;A) in the four portfolio choice problems and here CARA index
is 8. Notice that the higher the subjects degree of risk aversion, the higher her CARA
index, the less risky is the pattern she chooses. Table 4 shows that in our experiment
more than 1/2 of subjects select lotteries in tasks 1 to 4 in a way that is compatible
with CARA.14 Results of the elicitation are provided disentangled by treatments in order
to show possible di¤erences in the distribution of the CARA ordering among the three
subject pools. Indeed, although the percentage of explained patterns is higher for subjects
participating in treatment 2, we do not nd any signicant di¤erence in the distribution
of CARA ordering in the three treatments (see section 4.1).
Predicted pattern under CARA Experimental Data
Intervals of
ARA
Pattern
(lj11 ; l
j2
2 ; l
j3
3 ; l
j4
4 )
Index
CARA
Tr. 1 Tr. 2 Tr. 3 All % TOT
0:077 < ARA < +1 (A;A;A;A) 9 1 3 0 4 7.41%
0:054 < ARA  0:077 (B;A;B;A) 8 0 3 2 5 9.26%
0:046 < ARA  0:054 (B;B;B;B) 7 2 3 4 9 16.67%
0:033 < ARA  0:046 (C;B;C;B) 6 1 3 1 5 9.26%
0:032 < ARA  0:033 (D;B;D;B) 5 2 0 1 3 5.56%
0:027 < ARA  0:032 (D;C;D;B) 4 0 2 0 2 3.70%
0:023 < ARA  0:027 (D;C;D;C) 3 2 0 1 3 5.56%
0:016 < ARA  0:023 (D;D;D;C) 2 7 1 2 10 18.52%
 1 < ARA  0:016 (D;D;D;D) 1 3 6 4 13 24.07%
No. of Observations 18 21 15 54
% Explained 51% 60% 43% 51%
Table 4. Optimal answers for Tasks 1-4 under CARA.
Now, suppose that the subject has Constant Relative Risk Averse (henceforth CRRA),
so that u(c) = c1 RRA=(1  RRA) for all c. Under this specication, one can compute for
task 1 the critical RRAAB1 that yields indi¤erence between lotteries A and B:
1
2
 
xA1
1 RRAAB1 + 1
2
 
xA1
1 RRAAB1 = 1
2
 
xB1
1 RRAAB1 + 1
2
 
xB1
1 RRAAB1
We obtain RRAAB1 = 1:320. We proceed in a similar fashion for the other pairs of lotteries
(B;C) and (C;D), and for the other tasks 2, 3 and 4. We order Constant Relative Risk
14When checking if a behavioral pattern in tasks 1-4 is compatible with CARA, we allow up to only one
possible deviation of at most one lottery ljtt from each of the theoretical patterns. For example, we assign
a CARA index to pattern (B;C;B;B), namely index 7, but we do not to assign any index to (B;D;B;B)
or to (C;C;B;B).
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Averse (henceforth CRRA) subjects according to their lottery choices in tasks 1-4, as in
Table 5. The interpretation of Table 5 is the same as in Table 4, with RRA in place of
ARA. Again, the higher the subjects degree of risk aversion, the higher her CRRA index,
the less risky is the pattern she chooses. Table 5 shows that in our experiment almost
3/4 of subjects have a quadruplet of choices that is compatible with CRRA. Although
the percentage of explained patterns is higher for subjects participating in treatment 2,
we do not nd any signicant di¤erence in the distribution of CARA ordering in the three
treatments (see section 4.1)15
Predicted pattern under CRRA Experimental Data
Intervals of
RRA
Pattern
(lj11 ; l
j2
2 ; l
j3
3 ; l
j4
4 )
Index
CRRA
Tr. 1 Tr. 2 Tr. 3 All % TOT
1:320 < RRA < +1 (A;A;A;A) 12 1 3 0 4 5.26%
0:890 < RRA  1:320 (A;A;B;A) 11 1 0 3 4 5.26%
0:805 < RRA  0:890 (A;A;B;B) 10 1 1 2 4 5.26%
0:670 < RRA  0:805 (A;A;C;B) 9 0 0 1 1 1.32%
0:575 < RRA  0:670 (B;A;C;B) 8 3 5 4 12 15.79%
0:440 < RRA  0:575 (B;A;D;B) 7 3 2 2 7 9.21%
0:439 < RRA  0:440 (B;A;D;C) 6 0 0 2 2 2.63%
0:382 < RRA  0:439 (B;B;D;C) 5 5 2 3 10 13.16%
0:244 < RRA  0:382 (C;B;D;C) 4 3 1 2 6 7.89%
0:197 < RRA  0:244 (C;C;D;D) 3 2 1 2 5 6.58%
0:123 < RRA  0:197 (D;C;D;D) 2 0 0 1 1 1.32%
 1 < RRA  0:123 (D;D;D;D) 1 9 6 5 20 26.32%
No. of Observations 28 21 27 76
% Explained 80% 60% 77% 72%
Table 5. Optimal answers for Tasks 1-4 under CRRA.
Notice that tasks 1-4 have been designed such that both a CARA subject and a CRRA
subject, in order to show that she is not risk-averse (respectively, RRA  0 and ARA  0),
should pick the riskiest pattern (lj11 ; l
j2
2 ; l
j3
3 ; l
j4
4 ) = (D;D;D;D), thereby being assigned
(CARA or CRRA) index 1. That is why, independently from the assumption of CARA
or CRRA, if the number of explained patterns is the same under the two specications,
we should nd by construction the same percentage of non-risk-averse subjects. Indeed,
15As for Table 4, when checking if a behavioral pattern in tasks 1-4 is compatible with CARA, we allow
up to only one possible deviation of at most one lottery ljtt from each of the theoretical patterns. For
example, we assign a CRRA index to pattern (B;B;C;B), namely index 8, but we do not assign any
index to (B;C;C;B) or to (C;B;C;B).
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we nd that this percentage is the same under the two specications, although CRRA
captures a higher number of patterns than CARA: around 1/4 of the explained patterns
are compatible with risk neutrality or risk loving. This percentage is close to the one found
in other experimental studies on risk-aversion elicitation in simple lotteries.16
Through the BDM mechanism proposed in task 5, a risk-averse (-loving) subject should
declare a certainty equivalent for lj44 the simple lottery she has been assigned in task 5 
lower (higher) than its expected value, i.e.17
CE(lj44 ) < (>)EV (l
j4
4 ) .
Given that in task 5 the lottery assigned to the subject is the same she has chosen in task
4, lj44 , our portfolio choice problem provides a theoretical prediction on CE(l
j4
4 ) in task 5
both under CARA and under CRRA specication. Suppose that the subjects pattern in
tasks 1-4 is compatible with CARA. Then, given her CARA index h = 1; 2; :::; 9, her ARA
belongs to the interval (ARAh; ARAh] for each h. Hence, given l
j4
4 = (x
j4
4 ; 0:5;x
j4
4 ; 0:5),
ARAh, ARAh, it is
CE(lj44 ;ARAh) =  
1
ARAh
ln

1
2
exp( ARAhxj44 ) +
1
2
exp( ARAhxj44 )

(1)
withARAh = ARAh; ARAh. Then, it should beCE(l
j4
4 ) 2 (CE(lj44 ;ARAh); CE(lj44 ;ARAh)].
If the subjects pattern in tasks 1-4 is compatible with CRRA, then, given lj44 and her
CRRA index k = 1; 2; :::; 12, her RRA belongs to the interval (RRAk; RRAk] for each k.
Hence, given lj44 = (x
j4
4 ; 0:5;x
j4
4 ; 0:5), RRAk, RRAk, it is
CE(lj44 ;RRAk) =

1
2
(xj44 )
1 RRA +
1
2
(xj44 )
1 RRA
 1
1 RRA
(2)
withRRAk = RRAk; RRAk. Then, it should beCE(l
j4
4 ) 2 (CE(lj44 ;RRAk); CE(lj44 ;RRAk)].
Let us now analyze subjects optimal behavior in tasks 6-10.
Consider a two-stage lottery L where the second stage is represented by a set of n+ 1
lotteries el  (x1; p1; :::;xS; pS); with possible payo¤s x1 > ::: > xS,  2 f0; :::; ng, ps  0
and sps = 1. The rst stage is represented by the lottery L having as possible outcomes
the second-stage lotteries el with probabilities (q1; :::; qn), with q  0 and n=0q = 1.
16For example, Holt and Laury (2002) nds 34% of subjects with RRA 2 ( 1; 0:150) in the low real
payo¤s task and 19% of subjects with RRA 2 ( 1; 0:150) in the 20x realpayo¤s task. Our tasks 1-4
contain lotteries whose expected payo¤s are between Holt and Laurys low realand 20x reallotteries
expected payo¤s.
17Karni and Safra (1987) has shown that the certainty equivalentof a lottery elicited using the BDM
mechanism respects the preference ordering if and only if preferences satisfy the independence axiom. This
is assumed in our theoretical analysis, given that we rely on KMM and so on EU.
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These are the second-order probabilities over the plausible probability distributions for el.
In all treatments of our experiment, we characterize the impact of information on the
value of lotteries in the KMM framework. Following KMM, it is assumed that the subjects
ex ante utility is measured by:
u(CE(L)) =  1
 
nX
=0
q(EU(el))! (3)
with
EU(el) = SX
s=1
psu(xs):
Function u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, and  captures subjects
smooth ambiguity attitude. In fact,  is a von Neumann-Morgenstern index function ac-
counting for the attitude toward mean preserving spreads in the induced distribution of
the expected utility of the one-stage lottery conditional to , namely EU(el). KMM dene
smooth ambiguity aversionand shows that it is equivalent to  being concave. There-
fore, it is equivalent to aversion to mean preserving spreads of the expected utility values
induced by the second-order subjective probability and lottery el. Then, dening function
v as v =   u, the certainty equivalent of the two-stage lottery is
CE(L) = v 1
 
nX
=0
qv(CE(el))! ; (4)
where CE(el) is the certainty equivalent of the one-stage lottery conditional to . Function
v is a von Neumann-Morgenstern index function accounting for the attitude toward mean
preserving spreads in certainty equivalents of the one-stage lottery conditional to , namely
CE(el).
Recall that in each task of our experiment, there are only two possible payo¤s, namely
x; x 2 R+, x > x. Therefore, the small urn is represented by the 10-ball one-stage lotteryel  (x; p;x; 1   p), where p = 10 is the objective probability given by the ratio of
the number of white balls  2 f0; 1; :::; 10g over 10. The second-order probabilities on the
possible compositions of the small urn depends upon the treatment under consideration. In
tasks 6-10 of treatments 1 and 2, the probability distribution (q0; :::; q10) over the one-stage
lotteries is objective. It is binomial in treatment 1 and uniform in treatment 2. Therefore,
in treatment 1, given a task from 6 to 10, the second-order objective probabilities are
always less dispersed than in the corresponding task in treatment 2.18
18In particular, in treatment 1 the objective second-order probabilities are as follows: In tasks 6 and 10,
q10 = q0 = 1=1024 ' 0:1%, q9 = q1 = 10=1024 ' 1%, q8 = q2 = 45=1024 ' 4:4%, q7 = q3 = 120=1024 '
11:7%, q6 = q4 = 210=1024 ' 20:5%, and q5 = 252=1024 ' 24:6%; in task 7, q7 = q3 = 1=16 = 6:25%,
17
Recall that in our experiment second-stage lotteries in tasks 5-9 have the same pair
of outcomes, so that their variety depends only on rst-order probabilities. Notice that
the simple lottery in task 5, lj44 , is analogous to a two-stage lottery with all second-stage
lotteries el=5 being lj44 , namely L5 := (q1; lj44 ; q2; lj44 ; ::; qn; lj44 ). We trivially assume that
L5  lj44 . In order to identify whether a subject shows aversion, neutrality or proneness
to ambiguity, we can rely on comparing the subjects answer to tasks 5 and 6. Recall that
in task 5, the subject is asked to value the unambiguous lottery that he/she selected in
task 4. In task 6, the subject is asked to do the same thing for an ambiguous urn with the
same expected probability for the two outcomes. This suggests the following operational
Denition 1.
Denition 1 (value-ambiguity attitude) Call CE(Lt) the subjects reservation price
for the two-stage lottery assigned in task t 2 f5; 6g. It can be interpreted as the certainty
equivalent of the two-stage lottery in task t. Then, a subject is value-ambiguity-averse if
CE(L6)  CE(L5). She is value-ambiguity-neutral if CE(L6) = CE(L5). She is value-
ambiguity-loving if CE(L6)  CE(L5).
In short, a value-ambiguity-averse subject values an ambiguous lottery less than its
unambiguous equivalent with the same mean probabilities. In the KMM model, this is
true if the subjects  function is concave.
Our experimental design o¤ers us an alternative to test ambiguity-aversion by compar-
ing the subjects answers to tasks 4 and 10. Remember that the two possible outcomes
in lotteries fA;B;C;Dg are the same in the two tasks. The di¤erence lies in the fact that
probabilities are unambiguously 1/2 in task 4, whereas there are ambiguous in task 10, with
mean 1/2. Dene a dispersion order  on set fA;B;C;Dg, such that D  C  B  A.
A more dispersed lottery is equivalent to a portfolio containing a larger share invested in
the risky asset.
Denition 2 (choice-ambiguity attitude) Call jt 2 fA;B;C;Dg the index of the lot-
tery chosen by a subject in task t 2 f4; 10g: Then, a subject is choice-ambiguity-averse if
j10  j4, i.e., if lottery j10 is not more dispersed than lottery j4. She is choice-ambiguity-
neutral if j10 = j4. She is choice-ambiguity-loving if j10  j4, i.e., lottery j10 is not less
dispersed than j4.
q6 = q4 = 4=16 = 25%, and q5 = 6=16 = 37:5%; in task 8, q10 = q3 = 1=128 ' 0:8%, q9 = q4 = 7=128 '
5:5%, q8 = q5 = 21=128 ' 16:4%, q7 = q6 = 35=128 ' 27:3%; in task 9, q7 = q0 = 1=128 ' 0:8%,
q6 = q1 = 7=128 ' 5:5%, q5 = q2 = 21=128 ' 16:4%, q4 = q3 = 35=128 ' 27:3%. All other q are zero. In
treatment 2 the objective second-order probabilities are: In tasks 6 and 10, q = 1=11 ' 9:1% for every
 = 0; 1; :::; 10; in task 7, q = 1=5 for every  = 3; 4; :::; 7; in task 8, q = 1=8 for every  = 3; 4; :::; 10; in
task 9, q = 1=8 for every  = 0; 1; :::; 7. All other q are zero.
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Equivalently, a choice-ambiguity-averse subject always reduces her demand for the risky
asset when the distribution of outcomes becomes ambiguous. In the KMM smooth am-
biguity aversion framework, Gollier (2012) has shown that it is not true in general that
the concavity of the  function implies the choice-ambiguity-aversion of the subject. In
other words, a smooth ambiguity-averse subject could have a larger demand for the ambi-
guity asset than another ambiguity-neutral subject with the same risk aversion. However,
Gollier (2012) provides su¢ cient conditions on the structure of the two-stage uncertainty
to re-establish the link between the concavity of  and ambiguity aversion. One of these
su¢ cient conditions is that the di¤erent second-stage distributions of the risky asset can
be ordered by the Monotone Likelihood Ratio stochastic order. Because the set of distri-
butions f(3; p; 2; 1  p) j = 0; :::; 10g can always be ordered by Monotone Likelihood
Ratio, we conclude that, in the KMM framework, the two denitions of value-ambiguity
aversion and choice-ambiguity aversion are equivalent, and are satised if  is concave.
This justies the following denition.
Denition 3 (coherent-ambiguity attitude) A subject is coherently-ambiguity-averse
if CE(L6)  CE(L5) and j10  j4, with at least one of the two relations holding strictly.
She is coherently-ambiguity-neutral if CE(L6) = CE(L5) and j10 = j4. She is coherently-
ambiguity-loving if CE(L6)  CE(L5) and j10  j4, with at least one of the two inequalities
holding strictly.
Our operational denition of coherent-ambiguity attitude is based on a double-check:
we compare subjects behavior in task 5 versus task 6 and in task 4 versus task 10. The
rst comparison tells us whether, given the two second-stage lottery-outcomes, she prefers
to know rst-order probability p than facing a mean-preserving spread of second-order
probabilities over the all possible p. The second comparison tells us whether she prefers
a less risky lottery (a less dispersed performance of the portfolio in Table 3) where this
mean-preserving spread takes place.
Let us now analyze how the certainty equivalent of the two-stage lottery varies when
moving from task 6 to tasks 7, 8 or 9 and whether this variation depends on the fact the
subject is ambiguity-averse. Let us rst compare CE(L7) to CE(L6): Remember that, in
each of our three treatments, the two-stage lottery in task 7 is obtained from task 6 by
symmetrically eliminating the plausibility of the extreme urns  = 0; 1; 2; 8; 9; 10. This
implies that we must objectively have q = 0 in task 7 for these . Compared to task 6,
the subjects subjective second-order probabilities must be symmetrically transferred from
the extreme urns to the less dispersed urns  = 3; :::; 7. This yields a mean-preserving
contraction in the distribution of eU  (EU(el0); q0; :::;EU(el10); q10); as we show now. In the
remainder of this section, let us normalize u in such a way that u(xj44 ) = 0 and u(x
j4
4 ) = 1;
so that EU(el) = p.
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Lemma 4 Consider a symmetric random variable ep  (p0; q0; :::; pn; qn), with p = =n,
q = qn  for all , and n > 2: Consider another symmetric random variable ep0 
(p0; q
0
0; :::; pn; q
0
n) on the same support, but with q
0
0 = q
0
n = 0 and q
0
 = q
0
n   q = qn  for
all  2 f1; :::; n  1g. It implies that E(ep0)  E(ep) for all concave functions , i.e., thatep0 is a Rothschild-Stiglitz mean-preserving contraction of ep:
Proof. Proof: Observe that, by symmetry, we have that
Eep = nX
=0
q

n
=
n=2X
=0
q


n
+
n  
n

=
n=2X
=0
q =
1
2
:
Because the same observation can be made for ep0, we have that Eep = Eep0 = 1=2: Becauseep0 is obtained from ep by a transfer of probability mass from the extreme states to the center
of the distribution, we conclude that ep is a mean-preserving spread of ep0: This concludes
the proof.
Repeating this lemma three times, we obtain that CE(L7) must be larger than CE(L6)
under smooth ambiguity aversion. Because L7 is still ambiguous, we also have that CE(L7)
is smaller than CE(L5): Thus we have that CE(L5)  CE(L7)  CE(L6). The opposite
result would hold under smooth ambiguity-loving. Observe that a crucial assumption for
the lemma is the symmetry of the second-order probability distributions. In treatments
1 and 2, the second-order probability distribution on the composition of the small urn is
either binomial or uniform, which are clearly symmetric. In treatment 3, the symmetry of
the second-order distribution will depend upon the subjects beliefs on the composition of
the big urn from which the small urn is built. However, the principle of insu¢ cient reason
suggests that the subject has symmetric beliefs on the composition of the big urn, and
therefore on the composition of the small urn generated by the Bernoullian process. Under
this principle, we can write the following proposition.
Proposition 5 If the subject is ambiguity-averse, then CE(L5)  CE(L7)  CE(L6). If
she is ambiguity-loving, then CE(L5)  CE(L7)  CE(L6). If she is ambiguity-neutral,
then CE(L5) = CE(L7) = CE(L6).
Let us now compare tasks 8 and 9 to task 6. Task 8 is similar to task 6 except that the
worst urns have been eliminated. Proposition 6 shows that the certainty equivalent of the
two-stage lottery proposed in that task 8 is greater than the one of the two-stage lottery
proposed in task 6, whatever the degree of ambiguity of the subject, i.e. independently of
the fact that she is ambiguity-averse, neutral or loving. The opposite result prevails for
task 9, in which the best urns have been removed. Therefore, comparison between task
6, 8 and 9 always leads to CE(L8)  CE(L6)  CE(L9), whatever the subjects attitude
toward ambiguity.
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Proposition 6 Suppose that new information implies that the worst (best) urns become
implausible, without reducing the probability q of any of the other urns. This new infor-
mation raises (reduces) the certainty equivalent of the lottery independent of the degree of
ambiguity aversion.
Proof. Because  is increasing and concave, it is obvious that any rst-degree or second-
degree stochastic dominance improving shift in the distribution of (q0; EU(el0); :::; qn; EU(eln)):
Because p = =n is increasing in ; so is EU(el) = pu(xj44 ) + (1   p)u(xj44 ). Suppose
that a new information makes the worst lotteries (el0;el1; :::;elm), m < n, totally implau-
sible. This implies that the new second-order probabilities take the form (bq0; bq1; :::; bqn);
with bq1 = bq2 = ::: = bqm = 0. This yields a rst-degree stochastic improvement if bqi  qi
for all i 2 fm+ 1; :::; ng : Therefore, under the assumption that both u and  are strictly
monotone, this new information raises the certainty equivalent of the lottery independent
of the degree of ambiguity aversion. Of course, the symmetric case also holds: Suppose
that new information implies that the best scenarii become implausible, without reducing
the probability q of any of the other scenarii. This new information reduces the certainty
equivalent of the lottery independent of the degree of ambiguity aversion.
This result also applies to the comparison between task 8 (task 9) and task 7: the
certainty equivalent of the two-stage lottery proposed in the former task must be greater
(smaller) than the one of the two-stage lottery proposed in task 6, whatever the degree
of ambiguity of the subject. Task 7 may be seen as a modication of Task 9 through
new information implying that the worse scenarii become implausible, without reducing
the probability q of any of the other scenarii in task 9. Task 7 may be also seen as a
modication of Task 8 through new information implying that the best scenarii become
implausible, without reducing the probability q of any of the other scenarii in task 8.
Therefore, we must have CE(L8)  CE(L7)  CE(L9) independent of the shape of .
Let us now try to establish the complete ranking of the values of tasks 5 to 9 under
smooth ambiguity aversion. We have seen earlier that smooth ambiguity aversion implies
that CE(L5)  CE(L7)  CE(L6): Combining these three sequences of inequalities implies
that, under smooth ambiguity aversion, we have that
CE(L5)
CE(L8)
)
 CE(L7)  CE(L6)  CE(L9); (5)
independent of subjects attitude toward risk. The only degree of freedom under smooth
ambiguity aversion is thus about the relative values of task 5 (no ambiguity: q5 = 1) and
task 8 (ambiguity with worst urns eliminated: q0 = q1 = q2 = 0). If ambiguity aversion
is small enough, i.e., if the concavity of  is small, then the large expected probability
of the high outcome enjoyed in task 8 will dominate the ambiguity aversion e¤ect to
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yield CE(L8)  CE(L5); otherwise CE(L8) < CE(L5). The following result is a direct
consequence of Gollier (2001, Section 6.3.2).
Proposition 7 Suppose that a subject prefers the unambiguous lottery L5 to the ambiguous
lottery L8 (this is possible only under ambiguity aversion): Then, an increase in ambiguity
aversion in the KMM model can never reverse this ranking.
This implies that, assuming similar attitudes toward risk, any subject with CE(L5) <
CE(L8) has a smaller degree of smooth ambiguity aversion than any subject withCE(L5) 
CE(L8): Thus, comparing the values of task 5 and 8 for ambiguity-averse subjects allows
us to get some information about their degree of ambiguity aversion.
Of course, in the limit case of smooth ambiguity-neutrality, we must have that
CE(L8) > CE(L5) = CE(L6) = CE(L7) > CE(L9); (6)
independent of subjects attitude toward risk. Finally, for an ambiguity-loving subject,we
obtain that
CE(L8)  CE(L6)  CE(L7) 
(
CE(L5)
CE(L9)
; (7)
independent of her attitude toward risk. If the degree of ambiguity proneness is small
enough, i.e., if the convexity of  is small, then the low expected probability of the high
outcome faced in task 9 will dominate the attractiveness of this ambiguous lottery for
ambiguity-loving subjects, so that CE(L9) < CE(L5); otherwise CE(L9)  CE(L5).
Proposition 8 Suppose that a subject prefers the unambiguous lottery L5 to the ambiguous
lottery L9 (this is possible also under ambiguity proneness): Then, a concave transformation
of the  function in the KMM model can never reverse this ranking.
Thus, comparing the values of task 5 and 9 for ambiguity-loving subjects allows us to
get some information about their degree of ambiguity proneness.
The next corollary shows the di¤erence among certainty equivalents of two-stage lot-
teries in the same task of di¤erent treatments. The comparison of treatments 1 and 2 is the
easiest. The uniform distribution of the second-order probabilities in treatment 2 is clearly
a mean-preserving spread of the binomial distribution obtained in treatment 1. Comparing
the certainty equivalents for treatments 1 and 3 is more di¢ cult. In both treatments, a
Bernoullian process is applied to build the small urn, but the parameter p of the Bernoulli
distribution is 1/2 in treatment 1, whereas it is unknown in treatment 3. If one accepts
the principle of insu¢ cient reason, then one may assume that the third-order probabili-
ties on parameter p yields Ep = 1=2. Under this assumption, treatment 3 always yields
a mean-preserving spread of the second-order probability distribution (q0; :::; qn). Under
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ambiguity aversion, this yields a reduction of the certainty equivalents. This yields the
following result.
Corollary 9 If the subject is ambiguity-averse (-loving), then CEt is greater (smaller) in
treatment 1 than in treatments 2 and 3 for every t = 6; 7; 8; 9.
By combining Proposition 7, Proposition 8 and Corollary 9, we obtain an interesting
behavioral prediction about possible treatment di¤erences. Although our design is not
within-subject, we have seen from Table 4 and Table 5 that the distribution of the degree
of risk aversion does not di¤er among the three treatments, both if we use a CARA
and if we use a CRRA specication. Then, if we assume that the distribution of the
degree of ambiguity aversion is the same among the three treatments, then for similar
degrees of risk aversion we should nd that the percentage of ambiguity-averse subjects
with CE(L5)  CE(L8) is lower in treatment 1 than in treatments 2 and 3. By combining
Proposition 8 and Corollary 9 for ambiguity-loving subjects: if the distribution of the degree
of ambiguity proneness is the same among the three treatments, then the percentage of
ambiguity-loving subjects withCE(L9)  CE(L5) is lower in treatment 1 than in treatment
2 and 3 inside the same class of risk aversion.
4 Experimental Results
In this section we present our experimental results. First of all, in section 4.1 we briey
analyze the results of the elicitation of subjects risk aversion through the portfolio choice
method of tasks 1-4. Then, in section 4.2, we classify subjects according to their ambiguity
attitude relying on the operational denition introduced in section 3. In section 4.3 we test
the main theoretical predictions derived in section 3. In section 4.4 we analyze treatment
e¤ects on the distribution of subjectsbeliefs over the second-order probabilities and on
the two-stage lotteries certainty equivalents given the task.
4.1 Risk aversion elicitation
The portfolio choice method used at the beginning of the experiment enables all subjects
to face the same set of lotteries in tasks 1-4: this allows to build a risk-attitude ordering
of subjects independent of lj44 , the lottery chosen in task 4. This is the rst reason why we
prefer to rely on it rather than on the certainty equivalent elicited in task 5, which instead
depends on lj44 . Further, our portfolio choice method has the advantage of imposing some
theoretically derived constraints which allow to check whether the subjects selected pattern
is compatible with a CARA and/or a CRRA specication. This provides an empirical
verication of what in many experimental studies on risk aversion is generally assumed.
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First, we check whether the portfolio choice method elicitation (tasks 1-4) leads to the
same ordering in terms of CE(L5) as the (more standard) BDM mechanism proposed in
task 5. Indeed, we nd a positive correlation (coe¤. = 0:46) and highly signicant (P-value
= 0:000) between CE(L5) as predicted by the CARA ordering derived from the selected
pattern in tasks 1-4 (see Table 4) and the one elicited through the BDM mechanism in task
5. If we use the CRRA in place of the CARA ordering, the former correlation is slightly
lower (coe¤. = 0:36) and again statistically signicant (P-value = 0:006).19
Second, we check whether there is any signicant di¤erence among the three treatments
in the distribution of CARA indexes or in the distribution of CRRA indexes. Although
the percentage of explained patterns under each specication is di¤erent in the Uniform
treatment (see respectively Table 4 and Table 5), we do not nd any signicant di¤erence
in the distribution of risk-aversion ordering in the three treatments. This is what Figure
C in the Appendix seems to suggest, both if we rely on the CARA and the CRRA speci-
cation. To provide support to the graphical representation, we have tested the di¤erences
in distribution of CARA ordering and CRRA ordering in the three treatments with two
di¤erent test: a Kruskal-Wallis test20 and a Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions
test21 with a pairwise comparison between treatments.22
Therefore, both orderings are correlated with the certainty equivalent of task 5 and
lead to similar distributions of risk attitude among treatments. Without assuming whether
subjects are CARA or CRRA, we use both specications when analyzing possible relations
between the subjects degree of risk aversion and her behavior in tasks 6-10.
It is true that all the theoretical predictions derived in section 3 within the KMM
framework should hold whatever the subjects risk aversion. Nevertheless we look for pos-
sible correlations between risk attitude and ambiguity attitude. Further, we want to check
that risk attitude does not play any role when testing our main theoretical predictions,
which we have shown to hold independently of the subjects risk attitude. Finally, includ-
ing risk aversion as an explanatory variable in our econometric analysis may be useful in
order to provide an experimental answer to some open theoretical questions as the sign
19More precisely, as CE(L5) predicted by the CARA ordering we consider the average between
CE(lj44 ;ARAh) and CE(l
j4
4 ;ARAh) in (1), for h = 1; 2; :::; 9. Similarly, for the CE(L5) predicted by
the CRRA ordering we consider the average between CE(lj44 ;RRAk) and CE(l
j4
4 ;RRAk) in (2), for
k = 1; 2; :::; 12.
20The Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test (non-parametric) tests the hypothesis that several
samples are from the same population.
21The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (non-parametric) compares two observed distributions f(x) and g(x).
The procedure involved forming the cumulative frequency distributions F(x) and G(x) and nding the size
of the largest di¤erence between these. The hypothesis that has been tested is whether the two observed
distributions are equal (we perform a pairwise comparison between treatment 1-treatment 2, treatment
1-treatment 3 and treatment 2-treatment 3).
22According to the Kruskal-Wallis test we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equality of distributions
(P-value = 0:401 for CARA and P-value = 0:357 for CRRA). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conrms this
result.
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of CE(L8)   CE(L5) for ambiguity-averse subjects or the sign of CE(L9)   CE(L5) for
ambiguity-loving ones. Notice that for ambiguity-neutral subjects it is always CE(L8) >
CE(L5) and CE(L9) < CE(L5).
4.2 Ambiguity aversion elicitation
In Table 6, we classify subjects being ambiguity-averse, ambiguity-neutral and ambiguity-
loving in each treatment according to Denition 3 (coherent-ambiguity-attitude). Notice
that almost 1/2 of the classied subjects are ambiguity-averse, while less than 1/5 are
ambiguity-loving. Only 13 subjects (less than 12% of the sample) participating in our ex-
periment cannot be classied according to Denition 3: around half of them are ambiguity-
averse according to Denition 1 (value-ambiguity attitude) and ambiguity-loving according
to Denition 2 (choice-ambiguity attitude). The other half of them are value-ambiguity-
loving and choice-ambiguity-averse.23 Given the small percentage of unclassied subjects,
we can conclude that concavity of the  function implies choice-ambiguity-aversion in our
experimental tasks. This was exactly our theoretical prediction, given that the di¤erent
second-stage distributions of the risky asset have been set such that they can be ordered
according to the Monotone Likelihood Ratio stochastic order (see Gollier, 2012). Indeed,
the correlation between strong value-ambiguity-aversion (CE(L6) < CE(L5)) and strong
choice-ambiguity-aversion (j10  j4) is positive, not very high (coe¤. = 0:18), but statis-
tically signicant (P-value = 0:074). We will further analyze this last result at the end of
section 4.3, by showing that in our sample subjects with strong choice-ambiguity-aversion
are usually non-strongly choice-ambiguity-averse.
Binomial Uniform Unknown TOTAL
coherent-AA 13 15 17 45
coherent-AN 16 5 8 29
coherent-AL 5 9 4 18
Total
Classied
34 29 29 92
value-AA & choice-AL 1 4 2 7
value-AL & choice-AA 0 2 4 6
Total
Unclassied
1 6 6 13
Table 6. Classication of (coherent) ambiguity attitude according to Denition 3.
23Although the number of unclassied subjects is lower in the Binomial than in the other two treatments,
unclassied subjects are not statistically di¤erent from classied ones neither with respect to CARA or
CRRA ordering nor with respect to the lottery chosen in task 4.
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From Table 6, one can also see that the percentage of classied subjects being ambiguity-
averse is lower in the Binomial than in the Uniform treatment and in the Unknown treat-
ment. Further, the percentage of classied subjects being ambiguity-neutral is higher in
the Binomial than in the other two treatments.
Let us dene the signof the ambiguity attitude as being negative if the subject is
ambiguity-averse, null if she is ambiguity-neutral and positive if she is ambiguity-loving.
Looking at the multinomial logistic regression of the sign of the ambiguity attitude over
the treatment, we nd that the relative risk ratio for being ambiguity-neutral versus be-
ing ambiguity-averse is 0:27 (P-value = 0:040) when switching from the Binomial to the
Uniform treatment and 0:38 (P-value = 0:091) when switching from the Binomial to the
Unknown treatment. In other words, the expected probability of being ambiguity-neutral
seems to be higher for subjects who participate in the Binomial treatment. Table 6 also
shows that the percentage of subjects being ambiguity-loving is lower in the Binomial than
in the Uniform treatment, but not in the Unknown treatment. However, a multinomial
logistic regression of the ambiguity attitude over the treatment shows that the relative risk
ratio for being ambiguity-loving versus being ambiguity-averse is 1:56 (not statistically sig-
nicant: P-value = 0:510) when switching from the Binomial to the Uniform treatment
and 0:62 (not statistically signicant: P-value = 0:521) when switching from the Binomial
to the Unknown treatment.24
A possible explanation of this result relies on Corollary 9. Given the degree of ambigu-
ity attitude, jCE(L6)  CE(L5)j is lower in the Binomial than in the Uniform treatment.
This is due to the fact that the distribution of second-order probabilities is less dispersed
in the Binomial than in the Uniform treatment. Moreover, recall that the set of possible
certainty equivalent values that a subject may select is discrete. Therefore, if a subject
is slightly-ambiguity-averse or slightly-ambiguity-loving, it is more likely for her to choose
CE(L6) = CE(L5) in the Binomial than in the Uniform treatment.25. The intuition
based on Corollary 9 applies also to the comparison between the Binomial and the Un-
known treatment. Indeed, the percentage of ambiguity-averse (loving) subjects in the
Unknown treatment is higher (lower) with respect to the other two treatments, although
this di¤erence is not signicant (Kruskal-Wallis, P-value = 0:258). However, doing a pair-
wise comparison between treatments about the percentage of ambiguity-averse subjects, we
nd that there is not statistically signicant di¤erence between the Binomial and the Uni-
24These results are not shown but are available upon request.
25This intuition is reinforced by the fact the correlation between (strong) value-ambiguity-aversion and
(strong) choice-ambiguity-aversion found above in all the sample of classied subjects is higher (coe¤. 0:45)
and signicant (P-value 0:007) only if we restrict the analysis at the Binomial treatment. In this treatment,
it is plausible that only highly-ambiguity-averse subjects show at the same time CE(L6) < CE(L5) and
j10  j4.
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form treatment (t-test, P-value = 0:290)26, and between the Uniform and the Unknown
treatment (P-value = 0:605), while the di¤erence between the Binomial and the Unknown
treatment is almost signicant (P-value = 0:109). This distortion conrms our intuition
about the interpretation of the Unknown treatment. Both in the Binomial and in the
Unknown treatment the 10-ball small urn in task 6 has been generated through the same
Bernoullian process. However, the latter treatment is intrinsically more ambiguous, given
that there is no information about the composition of the big urn from which the small
unknown urn is generated. According to KMM, this generates smaller CE(L6) through
(4) and/or lower j10 through (3) in the Unknown than in the Binomial treatment, thereby
signicantly increasing the percentage of subjects for which it is CE(L6)  CE(L5) and
j10  j4. Notice that if we disentangle value-ambiguity aversion and choice-ambiguity
aversion, we still nd a higher percentage of subjects in the Unknown than in the Binomial
treatment, although this di¤erence is no more statistically signicant.
Let us conclude this paragraph by analyzing the relation between the sign of the am-
biguity attitude (as dened in the following sentence) and the degree of risk aversion.
Figure 1 shows that both the distribution of CARA indexes and the distribution of CRRA
indexes di¤er according to the sign of the ambiguity attitude. Indeed, under both spec-
ications, the modal risk-aversion index for ambiguity-averse and for ambiguity-neutral
is 1 (non-risk-averse subjects), while the modal index for ambiguity-loving subjects is 8
(highly-risk-averse subjects). We do nd that di¤erences in the distributions of our risk-
aversion ordering among di¤erent signs of the ambiguity attitude are signicant.27 This
supposed negative correlation between the sign of the ambiguity attitude and the index
of risk aversion is conrmed by rank correlation tests for ambiguity-neutral subjects un-
der CARA (coe¤. =  0:28, P-value = 0:063) and for ambiguity-loving subjects under
both specications (under CARA: coe¤. =  0:39, P-value = 0:007; under CRRA, coe¤.
=  0:30, P-value = 0:013). We do not nd that this negative correlation is signicant for
ambiguity-averse subjects. However, if we disentangle ambiguity-averse subjects according
to Denition 1 and Denition 2, we nd that the negative correlation between the fact of
being choice-ambiguity-averse and the index of risk aversion is signicant (under CARA:
coe¤. =  0:30, P-value = 0:029; under CRRA, coe¤. =  0:31, P-value = 0:007).
26The t-test is any statistical hypothesis test (parametric) in which the test statistic follows a Students
t distribution if the null hypothesis is supported. Here we run a two-sample t-tests for a di¤erence in mean
(the null hypothesis is that the two samples have the same mean).
27In order to test the equality in the distribution of the risk-aversion indexes among di¤erent signs
of the ambiguity attitude, we have performed two di¤erent tests: Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations
rank test and Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test. We nd that both under CARA and
under CRRA, we can reject the null hypothesis of equality in distributions according to the Kruskal-Wallis
equality-of-populations rank test (respectively for CARA and CRRA: P-value = 0:0100, P-value = 0:0100).
By perfoming the Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test with a pairwise comparison between
di¤erent signs of the ambiguity attitude, we nd that the results are consistent with the Kruskal-Wallis
test.
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We can empirically observe the relation between the CARA (or CRRA) ordering and
the sign of the ambiguity attitude also by eliciting choice-ambiguity-aversion (tasks 4 and
10), which relies on the same method used to elicit risk aversion (tasks 1-4). Figure 1
seems to conrm our intuition: very few ambiguity-averse subjects (less than 5%) choose
the least risky lottery in task 4, while the vast majority of ambiguity-loving ones (61%)
choose this lottery in task 4; moreover, none of the latter chooses the riskiest lottery in
task 4. We do nd that di¤erences in the distributions of lj44 among the three groups of
subjects averse, neutral and prone to ambiguity are signicant.28
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Figure 2. Distribution of lottery chosen in task 4
by ambiguity attitude.
This point can be further claried by introducing in the analysis the subjects guess on the
number of balls linked to the highest of the two lottery-outcomes (henceforth, winning
balls) in task 6, that we could interpret as the subjects modal belief on the composition
of the small unknown urn. This guess may have inuenced the certainty equivalent in task
6 and so the sign of value-ambiguity-aversion.29 By looking at the upper-left part of Figure
D, one can notice that also the distribution of subjects guess in task 6 is signicantly
di¤erent among di¤erent signs of the ambiguity attitude.30
Indeed, with a multivariate regression analysis we nd that  controlling or not for
treatment e¤ect both lj44 and the guess in task 6 are highly signicant (respectively, P-
28Again we have performed a Kruskal-Wallis test to check whether the distributions of lj44 are di¤erent
by treatment. According to this test, we can reject the null hypothesis of equality in distribution (P-value
= 0:000). We have also perfomed a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with a pairwise comparison between di¤erent
signs of the ambiguity attitude and the results are consistent with the Kruskal-Wallis test.
29The guess in task 6 is positively correlated (coe¤. = 0:20, P-value = 0:045) with the normalized
CE(L6). In section 4.4 we explain what we intend with normalizedcertainty equivalent.
30Through the Kruskal-Wallis test, we can reject the null hypothesis of equality in distribution (P-value
= 0:000). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conrms this result.
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value = 0:000 and P-value = 0:001): the former has a positive e¤ect on being ambiguity-
averse, while the latter has a negative one.
About the positive e¤ect of lj44 , we may think that subjects have made some kind of
hedging between the higher risk they accepted through the choice of a risky lottery in task
4 and the ambiguous second-order probabilities over this (second-stage) lottery (task 10).
Indeed, if we disentangle value-ambiguity aversion and choice-ambiguity aversion, we nd
a positive and highly signicant correlation between lj44 and each measure of ambiguity
attitude: respectively, coe¤. = 0:24 (P-value = 0:023) for value-ambiguity aversion and
coe¤. = 0:42 (P-value = 0:000) for choice-ambiguity aversion.
About the negative e¤ect of the guess of the number of winning balls in task 6, this
plays a role through a decrease of CE(L6) and of j10. We will see in section 4.4 that
the distribution of subjectsguess in task 6 does not depend on the treatment where the
subjects have participated, i.e. on the di¤erent distributions of second-order probabilities
that we have generated through our experimental design.
4.3 Test of the main theoretical results
In this paragraph, we report and comment about the percentage of classied subjects who
satisfy the theoretical predictions stated in section 3. We disentangle classied subjects
according to the sign of their ambiguity attitude (averse, neutral and loving) and accord-
ing to the treatment where they participated. All the theoretical predictions tested in
this paragraph should hold independent of the treatment. A rst set of theoretical predic-
tions (Proposition 5) state di¤erent conditions for ambiguity-averse, ambiguity-neutral and
ambiguity-loving subjects. A second set of theoretical predictions (Proposition 6) should
hold whatever the sign of the ambiguity attitude.
Figure 3 summarizes the percentage of subjects classied according to Denition 3
whose behavior in tasks 5-7 complies with Proposition 5. In particular, for 78% (35/45)
of ambiguity-averse subjects it is CE(L5)  CE(L7)  CE(L6); for 86% (25/29) of
ambiguity-neutral subjects it is CE(L5) = CE(L7) = CE(L6); for about 78% (14/18)
of ambiguity-loving subjects it is CE(L5)  CE(L7)  CE(L6). Although the percentage
of subjects fullling predictions of Proposition 5 is higher among the ambiguity-neutral
ones, validity of these predictions does not depend on the sign of the ambiguity attitude.
On the other hand, there is some dependences on the treatment. Through a t-test, we
get that the percentage of subjects complying with Proposition 5 is almost signicantly
higher in the Binomial (P-value = 0:124) and in the Unknown (P-value = 0:120) than in
the Uniform treatment. Finally, this compliance is uncorrelated with subjects CARA or
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CRRA ordering, as predicted by Proposition 5.31
Figure 3. Percentage of subjects satisfying Proposition 5, by treatment and ambiguity attitude.
Figure 4 reports the percentage of subjects whose behavior in tasks 6-9 complies with
Proposition 6 respectively w.r.t to CE(L6) (Figure 4.a) and w.r.t. CE(L7) (Figure 4.b).
Recall that Proposition 6 provides the same prediction for all subjects being classied
according to Denition 3, whatever the sign of their ambiguity attitude and their degree of
ambiguity aversion. It is easy to notice that the percentage of subjects fullling Proposition
6 is even higher than for Proposition 5 and that it does not depend on which of the two
reference certainty equivalents we applied it, CE(L6) or CE(L7). In both cases, more than
90% of ambiguity-averse subjects (42/45 for CE(L6), 41/45 for CE(L7)), all ambiguity-
neutral subjects (29/29) and more than 70% ambiguity-loving subjects (13/18) comply
with Proposition 6. As further proof of rationalbehavior of this huge pool of subjects,
notice that there are only 4/84 subjects satisfying Proposition 6 w.r.t CE(L6) and not
satisfying it also w.r.t to CE(L7); there are only 3/83 subjects who fullls the predictions
w.r.t CE(L7) and not w.r.t to CE(L6).
There are not signicant di¤erences by treatment if we take as reference CE(L6). If
instead we take as reference CE(L7), the percentage of subjects being consistent with
Proposition 6 is slightly higher in the Binomial than in the Uniform treatment, with this
di¤erence being signicant (P-value = 0:055). On the other hand, whatever the reference
certainty equivalent, CE(L6) or CE(L7), we nd a signicant di¤erence by the sign of
the ambiguity attitude. Indeed, the percentage of ambiguity-loving subjects complying
with Proposition 6 is signicantly lower than the proportion of ambiguity-averse ones32
31P-value = 0:546 for CARA, P-value = 0:841 for CRRA.
32P-value = 0:023 for CE(L6), P-value = 0:054 for CE(L7).
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and the proportion of ambiguity-neutral ones33. Again, compliance with the prediction of
Proposition 6 is uncorrelated with subjects CARA or CRRA ordering.34
Figure 4. Percentage of subjects satisfying Proposition 6, by treatment and ambiguity attitude.
Figure 5 shows the percentage of classied subjects whose behavior in tasks 5-9 satises
at the same time both Proposition 5 and Proposition 6. As we have seen in section 3, the
two propositions taken together lead to relation (5) for ambiguity-averse, relation (6) for
ambiguity-neutral, and relation (7) for ambiguity-loving subjects. Indeed, more than 75%
of classied subjects (70/92) states their certainty equivalents in tasks 5-9 in a way that
33P-value = 0:002 for both CE(L6) and CE(L7).
34If we take as reference CE(L6), it is P-value = 0:202 for CARA, P-value = 0:278 for CRRA. If we
take as reference CE(L7), it is P-value = 0:216 for CARA, P-value = 0:333 for CRRA.
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all the rationality constraints imposed by the KMM model are satised. Notice that
between Proposition 5 and Proposition 6 the former cuts much more observations, given
that percentages of verication in Figure 5 are only slightly lower than those in Figure 3. In
addition, ambiguity-loving subjects have a lower ratio of fulllment of propositions 5 and 6
taken together (61%, 11/18) than ambiguity-averse subjects (76%, 34/45) and ambiguity-
neutral ones (86%, 25/29), although this di¤erence is not signicant, maybe because of the
low number of ambiguity-loving subjects in our sample. Notice that all ambiguity-neutral
subjects fullling Proposition 5 also fulll Proposition 6.
Furthermore, we nd signicant di¤erences both by sign of the ambiguity attitude
and by treatment. About the former, we nd that the percentage of ambiguity-loving
subjects complying with both propositions is again signicantly lower than the proportion
of ambiguity-neutral ones (P-value = 0:038). About the latter, we have that (as for
Proposition 5) the percentage of subjects complying with both propositions is signicantly
higher in the Binomial (P-value = 0:038) and in the Unknown (P-value = 0:018) than
in the Uniform treatment. It is particularly striking that in the Unknown treatment all
subjects satisfying Proposition 5 satisfy also Proposition 6, both w.r.t to CE(L6) and w.r.t.
CE(L7): in fact, percentages of compliance with the theoretical predictions are the same
in Figure 3 and in Figure 5, whatever the sign of the ambiguity attitude. One more time,
compliance with the whole set of our theoretical predictions is uncorrelated with subjects
CARA or CRRA index:35
Figure 5. Percentage of subjects satisfying (5), (6) and (7), by treatment and ambiguity attitude.
[Note: Relations (5), (6) and (7) refer respectively to ambiguity-averse, ambiguity-neutral and
ambiguity-loving subjects.]
35P-value = 0:838 for CARA, P-value = 0:765 for CRRA.
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Finally, let us analyze subjects behavior in the only two tasks for which we do not
have a sharp theoretical prediction. We refer here to tasks 5 and 8 for ambiguity-averse
subjects and to tasks 5 and 9 for ambiguity-loving ones. From relation (6) we know that
in the limit case of smooth ambiguity-neutrality, we must have CE(L8) > CE(L5) and
CE(L5) > CE(L9). Therefore, in Figure 6 we classify as Lowthe ambiguity attitude
for those ambiguity-averse subjects and for those ambiguity-loving ones who behave as the
ambiguity-neutral ones, respectively in tasks 5 and 8 and in tasks 5 and 9. Mediumand
Highambiguity attitude are classied accordingly, that is a subject is highly-ambiguity-
averse if CE(L8) < CE(L5) and highly-ambiguity-loving if CE(L5) < CE(L9).
Figure 6. Disentangle of Low, Medium and High ambiguity aversion w.r.t.
CE(L8) R CE(L5) and ambiguity proneness w.r.t. CE(L5) R CE(L9).
Surprisingly enough, we nd the same percentage of highly-ambiguity-averse (10/45) and of
highly-ambiguity-loving (4/18) subjects in our sample. Subjects in the former group prefer
to know with certainty the composition of the small urn (task 5) rather than knowing only
that the worst scenarii are implausible (task 8). Specularly, subjects in the latter group
prefer to know only that the best scenarii are implausible (task 9) rather than knowing
with certainty the composition of the small urn (task 5). Notice that neither the sign
of CE(L8)   CE(L5) for ambiguity-averse subjects nor the sign of CE(L5)   CE(L9)
for ambiguity-loving ones is correlated with any of the explanatory variables introduced
above (treatment, CARA ordering, CRRA ordering, lottery chosen in task 4, guess on the
winning balls respectively in task 8 and in task 9).
The e¤ects of all these variables are not signicant at all, neither in the univariate analy-
sis considering each control singularly, nor in the multivariate regressions. The only signi-
cant result that we nd is actually quite counterintuitive. We nd that CE(L8) CE(L5) >
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0 depends positively on strong choice-ambiguity-aversion (i.e. j10  j4). This would
lead to conclude that strongly-choice-ambiguity-averse subjects are not so strongly-value-
ambiguity-averse (CE(L6) < CE(L5)), thereby explaining why the above found correlation
between strong choice-ambiguity-attitude and strong value-ambiguity-attitude, although
positive and signicant, is not so high.
As anticipated at the end of section 3, the combination of Proposition 7 and Corollary 9
suggests a possible treatment e¤ect on the percentage of ambiguity-averse subjects showing
CE(L5)  CE(L8) and on the percentage of ambiguity-loving subjects showing CE(L9) 
CE(L5). This prediction relies on the assumption of a similar distribution of risk attitude
among the three treatments, that we have shown is satised in section 4.1. Indeed, our
prediction on the treatment e¤ect over the size of the ambiguity attitude is veried. The
percentage of medium and highly-ambiguity-averse subjects is lower in the Binomial (31%,
4/13) than in the Uniform (60%, 9/15) and in the Unknown treatment (47%, 8/17), with
the di¤erence being almost signicant between the Binomial and the Uniform (P-value
= 0:131). Specularly, the percentage of medium- and highly-ambiguity-loving subjects is
lower in the Binomial (40%, 2/5) than in the Uniform (67%, 6/9) and in the Unknown
treatment (50%, 2/4).
4.4 Treatment E¤ects over beliefs and certainty equivalents
Let us conclude our analysis of the experimental results through a quick look at possible
treatment e¤ects over the certainty equivalents and over the guess of winning balls in tasks
6-9.
Corollary 9 states that CE(Lt) for t = 6; :::; 9 should be higher in the Binomial than in
the Uniform and in the Unknown treatment. If the subjects guess on winning balls in task
t would be correlated with CE(Lt) for t = 6; :::; 9, then we should nd that also this guess
should be higher in the Binomial treatment. Now, it is true that our experimental design
is between-subject, hence we cannot state whether and how a subject changes her certainty
equivalent (and her guess) according to the way in which at the beginning of task 6 the
unknown small urn is generated. However, under the assumption that the distribution of
risk attitudes and of ambiguity attitudes is not too di¤erent among treatments that is
what we have shown respectively in section 4.1 and in section 4.2 we can look at possible
di¤erences among treatments in the distribution of certainty equivalents and of guesses in
tasks 6-9.
In Figure 7 we report the distribution of subjectsguess on the number of winning balls
in tasks 6-9 disentangled by treatment. The graphs by treatment seem to suggest that
the distribution of guesses in the Unknown treatment is close to the one in the Binomial
treatment and both are quite di¤erent from the one in the Uniform treatment. This result
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is in line with the principle of insu¢ cient reason, that should lead a subject in the Binomial
and in the Unknown treatment to provide a guess equal to 5 in tasks 6 and 7, between 6
and 7 in task 8, and between 3 and 4 in task 9. Conversely, in the Uniform treatment, all
guesses should be equivalent: any guess over a scenario that is plausible in a specic task
is justiable.
However, we nd that the distribution of subjects guess in task t is not signicantly
di¤erent among treatments, for t = 6; 8; 9:36 Our intuition is instead right in task 7. Ac-
cording to the Kruskal-Wallis test on the equality in distribution of guesses by treatment,
we can reject the null hypothesis at a 10% level (P-value = 0:082). More precisely, accord-
ing to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-distributions test, there is not equality in the
distribution of guesses between the Binomial and the Uniform treatment (P-value = 0:003)
and between the Unknown and the Uniform treatment (P-value = 0:016). In this specic
task it seems that subjects in the Unknown treatment state similar guesses to those of
subjects in the Binomial one.
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Figure 7. Distribution of subjectsguess on the number of winning balls in tasks 6-9
by treatment.
36According to the Kruskal-Wallis test on the equality in distribution of guesses by treatment, we cannot
reject the null hypothesis (respectively for task 6, 8, 9, P-value: 0:739, 0:375, 0:175). The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov equality-of-distributions test with a pairwise comparison between treatments conrms this result.
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Let us now focus on the relation between certainty equivalents and subjects guesses.
We nd that, overall, the former are never correlated with the latter in tasks 6-9 within
the same task.37
In general, certainty equivalents in task t (CE(Lt)) are negatively correlated with the
CARA and/or with the CRRA ordering (recall that the ordering index increases with risk
aversion). This is reasonable: as shown above, the subjects certainty equivalent elicited
in task 5 (and in the following four tasks) rely on the lottery chosen in task 4. This choice
also depends on the CARA or the CRRA ordering elicited in tasks 1-4 (we have seen in
section 4.2 that it inuences also the sign of the ambiguity attitude). Moreover, in order to
further investigate the link between certainty equivalent and risk aversion, we consider the
lottery chosen in task 4 (lj44 ) and its relation with the normalizedvalues of the certainty
equivalents, i.e. their index in tasks 6-9, with CE(Lt) = x
j4
4 being assigned index 1 and
CE(Lt) = x
j4
4 being assigned index 11.
38 We report in Figure E in the Appendix the
normalizedvalues of CE(Lt) for t = 6; :::; 9.
Once we normalize CE(Lt), we nd that they are still correlated with the risk-attitude
index. However, while the relation between risk aversion and CE(L6); CE(L7) and CE(L8)
is negative, CE(L9) shows instead a positive relation with risk aversion. The last result
can be referred to the positive correlation between risk aversion and ambiguity proneness
highlighted in section 4.2.
Further, as long as the distribution of the second-order probabilities is symmetric around
 = 5 (tasks 6 and 7), the normalized certainty equivalents are correlated with the guesses
in the same task. We do not nd such a correlation in tasks 8 and 9.
A strong regularity is that by regressing either CE(Lt) or its normalized version over
the guess in the same task, the index of risk attitude and the treatment, we do not nd
signicant treatment e¤ects, for any t = 6; 7; 8; 9.39
As one can notice from Figure E, the di¤erences among treatments in the distribution
of normalized CE(Lt) are not statistically signicant for every t = 6; :::; 9. In addition,
the sign of all di¤erences CE(Lt+1)   CE(Lt) for t = 5; 6; 7 and CE(Lt+2)   CE(Lt) for
t = 6; 7 do not depend on the treatment.40
37However, we nd that CE(L6) is positively correlated (coe¤. = 0:35) with the guess in task 6 only
in the Uniform treatment (P-value = 0:037). We also nd that CE(L9) is positively correlated (coe¤.
= 0:36) with the guess in task 9 only in the Binomial treatment (P-value = 0:035).
38In task 5-9 we allow each subject to choose always among 11 possible selling prices. Therefore, for
every t = 5; 6; :::; 9 , we can always assign index 1 to CE(Lt) = x
j4
4 , index 11 to CE(Lt) = x
j4
4 and indexing
the internal CE(Lt) accordingly. See footnote 7.
39A relevant exception is again represented by the (normalized) certainty equivalent in task 7. Controlling
for CARA and treatment and taking the Binomial as reference treatment, we nd that the Unknown
treatment has a positive and signicant e¤ect (P-value = 0:059) over CE(L7). Controlling for CRRA and
treatment, we nd that also the Uniform treatment has a positive and signicant e¤ect (P-value = 0:041)
over CE(L7).
40To be more precise, only in the regressions for CE(L7)  CE(L6) > 0 (CE normalized) we nd that
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All this would lead to conclude that, despite some di¤erences in the distribution of
guesses among treatments, we do not nd any treatment e¤ect on the distribution of
certainty equivalents in the ambiguous tasks. Therefore, the only signicant di¤erence
among treatments is the one shown at the beginning of section 4.2 about the distribution
of (CE(L6) CE(L5)) if combined with the distribution of (j10 j4), i.e. the two conditions
leading to state a subjects coherent-ambiguity attitude.
Conclusion
Our work shows how to identify two features of smooth ambiguity attitude à la KMM :
value-ambiguity attitude and choice-ambiguity attitude. A value-ambiguity-averse subject
values an ambiguous lottery less than its unambiguous equivalent with the same mean
probabilities. A choice-ambiguity-averse subject always reduces her demand for the risky
asset when the distribution of outcomes becomes ambiguous.
We elicit these two attitudes in a series of experimental decision tasks designed in order
to match the main insights of KMM model. Our decision tasks are parameterized so
that a value-ambiguity averse (loving) subject should not necessarily behave as a choice-
ambiguity averse (loving) one, i.e. showing coherent-ambiguity aversion. Indeed, we nd
that 88% of our subjects (92/105) show a coherent-ambiguity attitude, independent of
the treatment, i.e. of the distribution of second-order probabilities (binomial, uniform or
unknown). This result clearly indicates an equivalence between value-ambiguity aversion
and choice-ambiguity aversion in subjects participating in our experiment. However, we do
not nd the same equivalence between strong value-ambiguity aversion and strong choice-
ambiguity aversion.
We believe that the most important contribution of the paper concerns the theoretical
analysis of those ambiguous tasks designed with the aim of testing KMM predictive power.
In section 3 we provide two kinds of theoretical predictions: those holding independent of
subjects (coherent)-ambiguity attitude and those stating specic behavior in correspon-
dence of a specic attitude to (coherent)-ambiguity. We nd that the former are satised
by more than 90% of our classied subjects (84/92), while the latter comply with behav-
ior of more than 80% of classied subjects (74/92). Overall, a large number of classied
subjects (76%, 70/92) satisfy all our theoretically derived constraints. This extremely high
compliance of subjectsbehavior to KMM indirectly provides support both to our oper-
ational denition of (coherent)-ambiguity attitude and to the fact that our experimental
design may be a correct representation of the main features of KMM in the laboratory.
the Uniform treatment increases signicantly the probability that CE(L7)  CE(L6) > 0 with respect to
the Binomial treatment (P-value = 0:040). This result holds also when controlling for the di¤erence in
the guesses about the number of winning balls in task 7 and task 6.
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We do not nd any signicant correlation between compliance to KMM and gender, age,
level of education and degree of risk attitude.
A secondary contribution of the paper concerns the analysis of possible relations be-
tween risk attitude and ambiguity attitude. We elicit risk attitude through the same two
methods portfolio choice and BDM used to elicit the two features respectively, choice
and value of coherent-ambiguity attitude. Risk-aversion orderings provided by the two
methods are correlated. Relying on the two risk-aversion orderings built through the rst
method, we nd that more than 1/2 of subjects may be classied as constant-absolute-
risk-averse and almost 3/4 may be constant-relative-risk-averse. Under both specications
of risk aversion, we nd a negative correlation between the degree of risk aversion elicited
in the unambiguous tasks and the fact of showing coherent-ambiguity aversion in the am-
biguous tasks. This correlation is signicant if we consider only choice-ambiguity-averse
subjects. More specically, in our sample many coherent-ambiguity-averse subjects have
a low degree of risk aversion, while the most part of coherent-ambiguity-loving subjects
have a high degree of risk aversion (77% of the coherent-ambiguity-loving subjects are in
the last two quintiles of the CARA index distribution and 73% are in the last two quintiles
of the CRRA index distribution). We have an explanation for this apparently surprising
result. In our design a subject is elicited her (coherent)-ambiguity attitude in correspon-
dence to a lottery that she has previously chosen among a set of lotteries having di¤erent
levels of riskiness. We nd that the riskier the lottery chosen by the subject when there
was no uncertainty about rst-order probabilities, the greater the decrease in her value
for this lottery when rst-order probabilities become ambiguous. The positive correlation
between the riskiness of the lottery assigned in the most ambiguous task and both value-
ambiguity aversion and choice-ambiguity aversion that we nd in the data supports this
explanation. However, we found this result through a between-subject design: we ask a
subject to state her certainty equivalent under di¤erent levels of ambiguity of the setting,
but always facing the same pair of (second-stage) lottery-outcomes. One may test whether
the e¤ect that we nd between-subjects holds also when the same subject is asked to state
her attitude towards ambiguity for di¤erent pairs of lottery-outcomes. We leave this for
further research.
The third contribution of the paper concerns the analysis of subjectsattitudes and de-
cisions in ambiguous tasks with specic distributions of second-order probabilities. We nd
that the percentage of coherently-ambiguity-averse subjects is lower (though not signi-
cantly) in the binomial than in the uniform treatment. This was easily predictable, given
that the latter distribution of the second-order probabilities is a mean-preserving spread
of the former. We also verify the prediction of a signicantly lower percentage of coherent-
ambiguity-averse subjects in the binomial than in the unknown treatment (the latter is
intrinsically more ambiguous than the former). What is more surprising is the absence
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of a signicant di¤erence in the percentage of coherent-ambiguity averse subjects between
the uniform and the ambiguous treatment. This would lead to validate the assumption
that subjective second-order probabilities may be thought as uniformly distributed when
the subject is not given any information about the composition of the unknown urn. This
conclusion is even stronger if one thinks at the fact that in our experiment ambiguity in
the unknown treatment has been generated through a process similar to the one used in
the binomial treatment. It seems that this process has inuenced subjectsguess about
the number of winningballs in the unknown urn: the distribution of this guess in the
unknown treatment is closer to the one in the binomial than in the uniform treatment
in one ambiguous task, with no signicant di¤erences in the remaining ambiguous tasks.
Despite that, it seems that the level of a subjects condence about her guess is completely
di¤erent when an objective probability distribution is given with respect to the case where
no information is provided about objective second-order probabilities. This may repre-
sent a further justication to the signicant di¤erence found between the percentage of
ambiguity-averse subjects in the binomial and in the unknown treatment.
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Appendix
Appendix A
Figure A. Description of the procedure followed to generate of the composition of the 10-ball
small urn used to perform task 6.
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Appendix B
For each lottery ljt = (x
j
t ; 0:5;x
j
t ; 0:5) in Table 2, we have expected value and standard
deviation respectively equal to EV = 0:5(x + x) and  = 0:5(x   x). The two lottery-
outcomes can be expressed in terms of the two moments, i.e. x = EV + and x = EV  .
In Table B, we classify the set of lotteries in tasks 1-4 in terms of the triple
 
EV; ; d
dEV

,
where the ratio d
dEV
is the same for all lotteries in the same task. In particular, it is d
dEV
= 3
in tasks 1 and 3 and d
dEV
= 5 in tasks 2 and 4.
Task t = 1 Task t = 2 Task t = 3 Task t = 4
Lottery EV j1 
j
1
dj1
dEV j1
EV j2 
j
2
dj2
dEV j2
EV j3 
j
3
dj3
dEV j3
EV j4 
j
4
dj4
dEV j4
j = A 9.0 3.0 3.0 8.5 2.5 5.0 17.0 3.0 3.0 16.5 2.5 5.0
j = B 10.0 6.0 3.0 9.0 5.0 5.0 18.0 6.0 3.0 17.0 5.0 5.0
j = C 11.0 9.0 3.0 9.5 7.5 5.0 19.0 9.0 3.0 18.0 10.0 5.0
j = D 12.0 12.0 3.0 10.0 10.0 5.0 20.0 12.0 3.0 19.0 15.0 5.0
Table B. Risk Attitude Elicitation method: reinterpretation in terms of EV , , and (d=dEV ).
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Figure C. Distribution of CARA index and CRRA index by treatment.
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Figure D. Distribution of subjectsguess on the number of winning balls in tasks 6-9
by ambiguity attitude.
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Figure E. Distribution of normalizedCE(Lt) in tasks 6-9 by treatment.
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